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Assertions which are undeniable are of ten dead 
ends in an investigation So it is with the assertion 
that metaphors are comparisons, a continually recurring 
claim and, to some extent, undeniable. To the extent 
that we accept that assertion, it neither explains 
what metaphors are nor contributes toward an explana-
tion We will do better not to be satisfied with 
calling metaphors comparisons, even at the risk of 
paradoxically denying the undeniable. 
Let us look at metaphoring as comparing. Every 
(live) metaphor, when uttered, presents the hearer or 
reader first of all with a "stop sign" because it is 
either false ('George is an ostrich' when George is a 
person)-or-.sortally incorrect (i e , contains seman-
tically incompatible lexical items 'The bicycle 
obJected to the hill') or irrelevant in context 
(proverbial metaphors 'It is difficult to transplant 
mature trees' when the topic is compelling old people 
to move from their homes) 
Since the goal of verbal communication is to 
understand and to be understood, the hearer assumes 
the speaker intends to speak meaningfully, to say what 
he believes to be true or otherwise worth saying, to 
speak on the topic or to give cues for changing it, and 
so on. These are essential background conventions of 
all language use 
Therefore, the hearer looks for a way to under-
stand a metaphorical utterance which is unacceptable 
on a standard interpretation The comparison view of 
metaphor is such a way. Metaphors are held to be 
implicit comparisons of obviously unlike things that 
nevertheless have something in common There is a 
likeness that can be salvaged from the comparison of 
such unlike things as George and ostriches, bicycles 
and obJecting things The similarity does not reside 
in the dissimilarity, as has sometimes been said, but 
iii the things which are so conspicuously dissimilar 1 
305 
306 1975 MID-AMERICA LINGUISTICS CONFERENCE 
'Comparison' is ambiguous: it is both an act of 
comparing and a result of comparing. The comparison 
view of metaphor stresses the result· based on an act 
of comparing, a metaphor can be reconstructed as an 
assertion that there is a likeness (or similarity or 
resemblance) between the things referred to by the 
metaphorical utterance. Or as an assertion that there 
is an analogy--a similar relationship to other things 
--between the things referred to. 
* * * * 
What can be said in favor of this view? The 
claim that the act of comparing is involved in under-
1 standing metaphors is the grain of truth in this 
theory that I cannot possibly deny. 
Comparing is probably the most basic cognitive 
activity. Let us define it as the putting together 
of two numerically distinct things and determining 
what is similar and dissimilar between them. It 
depends on the ability which we all have to Judge 
relative similarity. Comparing has enormous scope. 
It ranges from the scrutiny needed to tell an original 
painting from a good forgery to being momentarily 
struck by a resemblance between two people. Almost 
everything we do in using our senses or our reason 
involves comparing. We cannot correctly apply any 
word literally without evaluating the similarities 
and dissimilarities in a given situation since no two 
situations are identical.2 Comparing is a fortiori 
involved in understanding metaphors since-it is so 
universally involved in everything we do. This is not 
much of a triumph for the comparison theory of 
metaphor 
One reason why such a nonexplanatory explanation 
has been advanced is that metaphor is that trope which 
is not one of the more narrowly defined tropes, such 
as synecdoche, oxymoron, periphrasis, personification, 
and so on. Its function is thus residual· it does 
whatever the other tropes do not specifically do. Or 
to the modern student, unaware of the variety of 
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figures of speech, metaphor is highly general It is 
figurative language. In either case, as left-over or 
all-encompassing, only something as universal as 
comparison seems to fit. 
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The claim that metaphors can be reconstructed as 
assertions of likeness between unlike things gets its 
main support from some examples of meta~hors These 
are metaphors of the "copula link" form 'A is B', 
where A and B are general terms denoting obJects, such 
as 'Man is a wolf' For metaphors of this form whose 
constituent terms have highly determinate senses and 
highly conventionalized associations, 'A is B' can be 
reconstructed as 'A is like B' (with the proviso that 
we all know what As and Bs are) 
This doesn't work for all As and Bs in the 'A is 
B' form 'Geraniums are doorbells' and 'A child is a 
file folder' do not lend intuitive support to the 
comparison theory. Neither do metaphors of other 
syntactic forms 'The perfume lurked in the vial' or 
'He studied the thesis of the salad with care' 
Assertions of likeness or of analogy at least cannot 
immediately be reconstructed from these metaphors 
* * * * 
But we do not have to survey examples of metaphors 
to find problems with the comparison theory Stating 
likenesses found by comparing is different from utter-
ing a metaphor or even a simile This is the differ-
ence between asserting and what has been called 
metaphoring It is a difference of function in 
communication and, as a result, of truth-value I will 
not elaborate on this here 4 In passing, I ask you 
only to consider the differences between denying, 
proving or doubting assertions of likeness, such as 
'This desk is like the one you saw in the store window 
yesterday,' and metaphors or similes 
I want to discuss the dilemma that arises from 
treating metaphors as comparisons Open comparison--
simply converting the metaphor to an 'A is like B' 
308 1975 MID-AMERICA LINGUISTICS CONFERENCE 
statement--is uninformative, 'closed' comparison--'A is 
like B in such and such ways'--is more determinate than 
the metaphor it replaces. 
Why is open comparison uninformative?5 
1. Likeness is a matter of degree. Any two shades 
of red, for example, are like each other in a context 
of non-reds, but each is more like another shade of 
red than like the other. The likeness of any two 
things depends on the context in which they are 
compared, it is not absolute. 
2. Likeness between things (not perhaps between 
some simple properties) is likeness in some but not in 
all respects. A toy wagon is like a car in having four 
wheels but not like it with respect to size or weight. 
The wagon may be like a play table in size and perhaps 
like a balloon in color, and so on. 
3. The respects, or aspects, of any thing are 
exceedingly numerous. There are still many more mani-
fest, dispositional and relational properties of the 
toy wagon that could be a source of likenesses between 
it and other things. 
From 1. and 2. it follows that likeness is a 
nontransitive relation. We cannot infer from the 
statements that A is like B and that B is like C, that 
A is like c, nor that A is not like c. 
From 2. and 3. it follows that any two things can 
be seen as like each other in some respects. It may 
take imagination in some cases, but it is possible 
Therefore, to say simply that A is like B, where 
we mean 'in some way', is uninformative because that is 
true of any A and B whatsoever. 
The emptiness of open comparison may not be obvious 
because we so often use it successfully for practical 
ends When something is like another thing in most of 
its salient respects and to a high degree in context, we 
can informatively compare them. Someone who doesn't 
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know what a loveseat is gets some information by being 
told that loveseats are like sofas. Someone who knows 
Jane but not Jean gets some information by being told 
that Jean is like Jane Without the qualifications of 
~ of the salient respects and a high degree of 
likeness, comparisons can be useful but need to be 
extended with further explanations, examples and 
pointings out. Furthermore, which respects are salient 
is, at least to some extent, culture- or subculture-
dependent. 6 The photograph or the mirror image are 
for us clearly like what is photographed or reflected, 
but not for someone who has not learned the conventions 
of photographic or reflected likeness Even in infor-
mal use, open comparison readily drifts into 'closed' 
comparison 
A 'closed' comparison is an assertion of likeness 
between two things, giving the respects in which they 
are held to be like each other. This is informative, 
but when it is applied to metaphor, it requires infor-
mation to be supplied which is not given in the 
metaphor When that information is supplied, the com-
parison is more determinate than the metaphor. 
A statement of likeness in specified respects 
cannot paraphrase a metaphor because the information 
contents of paraphrase and metaphor are different 7 
The metaphor does not mention or imply those respects 
which are mentioned in the 'closed' comparison. 
Most students of metaphor agree that metaphors 
are not uniquely interpretable. Different interpreta-
tions of one metaphor are common and acceptable But 
if metaphors are held to be paraphrasable as 'closed' 
comparisons, then there will be different nonequiva-
lent paraphrases for one metaphor. This is not what 
we usually mean by paraphrase. 
Still another obJection is that the use of 
metaphors is unmotivated on this account If metaphors 
can be paraphrased as 'closed' comparisons, how much 
clearer to use a 'closed' comparison than a metaphor 
Metaphors are nothing but a more "decorative" way to 
say what can be said in other, less troublesome words 
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This view is generally discredited at the present time, 
as it deserves to be. Metaphors are used because they 
have heuristic value in revising our outlook on the 
world. This revision is sometimes momentary but 
sometimes lasting. A metaphor has the potential to 
continue generating conceptual revisions well beyond 
the context of its utterance. However, once a metaphor 
is frozen as a particular 'closed' comparison, its 
heuristic value is minimized, if not eliminated.a 
The view that metaphors are 'closed' comparisons 
may mean something other than that they are para-
phrasable as comparisons. Perhaps a hearer, in order 
to understand a metaphor, reconstructs it as a 'closed' 
comparison. Perhaps a speaker, in order to produce a 
metaphor, first constructs it as a 'closed' comparison. 
These 'closed' comparisons would not be available as 
paraphrases; they would be steps in the encoding-
decoding process. They could quite understandably 
be different for different speaker-hearers interpret-
ing the same metaphor. 
Such a view is represented by Dorothy Mack's 
article, "Metaphoring as Speech Act, 11 9 in which she 
tries to show that both metaphors and similes have the 
same deep structure, namely a 'closed' comparison 
between an assertion and a presupposition. She grants 
that metaphors (with the exception of dead metaphors) 
are not paraphrasable and also that Metaphors have 
"multiple meanings 11 .lO She characterizes metaphors 
as "highly deleted elliptical constructions"ll of, one 
must add, highly specific 'closed' comparisons of a 
single form. This is how it looks. 
[See Fig 1, next page] 
I question whether this is a legitimate use of a 
deletion operation. The deleted lexical items are not 
recoverable from the surface string, except in the 
simile, sentence t1.12 The deep structure shows 
additions made to the surface string in the process of 
giving the metaphor an interpretation. I see no reason 
to call this a syntactic operation. 
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a gazelle fJ ff 
a gazelle p 
fl barks 
doorbells p 
jJ asked a 
question 
a crab/crabs " 1 Simile The girl runs as swiftly as a gazelle 
2 Metaphor The girl is a gazelle. 
3 Verbal metaphor The boy barks 
4 Metaphor Geraniums are doorbells 
Sa /Sb Metaphor with ambiguous focus The crab 
asked a question 
The difference between the si~ile in #1. and the 
metaphor in #2 reveals one difficulty with this form 
Let us agree that 'Gazelles run swiftly' is a presu~so­
sition of the use of 'gazelle' in these utterances, 
but surely it is not the only one Gazelles are also 
delicate, graceful and soft-eyed. It may well be that 
a metaphorical identification of a girl and a gazelle 
calls for all of these presuppositions to enter into 
the interpretation of the utterance.14 It may be that 
all of them are involved, but not all with equal 
weight, so that the predicate of the presupposition 
cannot be represented as a conJunction. 
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It seems, in fact, that the choice of the relevant 
presupposition or presuppositions depends on the 
content of what Mack calls the assertion. These are 
not independent of each other. I believe that 
different presuppositions of 'pour' will be invoked 
for 
The coal poured down the chute. 
The crowd poured out of the theater. 
She was poured into that dress. 
And this seems merely an awkward way of saying that 
'pour' is to some degree reinterpreted by its role in 
particular metaphors.15 However, if this is so, we are 
not noting established likenesses between things but 
rather selecting likenesses (from the indefinitely 
many possible) to fit the total context. The very 
broad umbrella of 'comparing' covers this procedure 
but explains no more about it than calling it meta-
phorical reinterpretation.16 
That every metaphor contains an assertion, and 
yet is not an assertion, is another doubtful claim to 
me. I suspect that most metaphors contain, at best, 
a very defective assertion. In 'The boy barks' and 
'Geraniums are doorbells' the assertions would be 
something like 'The boy does something' and 
'Geraniums are such'. In 'He was overtaken in the 
race for my good Judgment,' I don't know how to rescue 
a nonmetaphorical assertion. 
* * * 
In conclusion, I have tried to show that the 
claim that metaphors are comparisons is vacuous if 
open comparison is meant. The claim that metaphors 
can be paraphrased as 'closed' comparisons is false 
because the paraphrase must include information not 
given in the metaphor. The claim that metaphors are 
constructed or reconstructed as 'closed' comparisons at 
the level of deep structure provides too rigid a 
pattern and demands too much of deep structure.17 The 
recommended procedure has technical problems because it 
provides for deletions not restricted by recoverability 
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conditions. The pattern does not comfortably fit many 
different forms of metaphors And I cannot see that 
this machinery contributes anything more precise to the 
following sketch speakers usually understand even new 
metaphors by giving them an interpretation which is 
nonstandard and which uses components of the senses of 
the lexical items as well as what is known about the 
referents of those items and about the context of 
utterance 
If that is vague as a single explanation, it is 
because a single explanation that can be expressed in 
a single sentence cannot say much about as complex a 
phenomenon as metaphor And that is what is wrong 
with saying that metaphors are-comparisons 
NOTES 
1 Burrell, among many others, slips into this way 
of talking, even though he has it right when quoting 
Aristotle. Cf Burrell 1973, pp 72, 242-3 
2Hesse 1966, pp 152-3, pp 11-2 
3Brooke-Rose 1958, a term from her typology 
4 1975 See Loewenberg a 
5Goodman 1960, 1968, 1970, Greenlee 1968 
6 One might ask a radical relativist who follows 
Goodman whether some aspects of things are not indeed 
universally salient. Quine gives with one hand and 
takes away with the other Language could not be 
learned, nor experience learned from, without "an 
innate standard of similarity our animal 
birthright " But this does not secure the reference 
to obJects which proves to be "behaviorally inscrut-
able." Quine 1969, pp 123, 35 Lewis 1969, p 38, 
insists that "we happen uniformly to notice some ana-
logies and ignore others " I am grateful to Edward 
Becker for raising this as yet unsettled question 
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7 Swanson 1961. 
8 Warner 1973, pp. 371-2. 
9Mack 1975. 
10Mack 1975, pp. 235, 236, 242. 
11Mack 1975, p. 240. 
12 Chomsky 1965, p. 177. 
13 It is unclear why this information invariably 
takes the form of a presupposition. I prefer to use 
'presupposition' more narrowly than Mack apparently 
does Although metaphors can be based on private or 
esoteric knowledge, they usually are based on knowledge 
widely shared in a speech community. This knowledge is 
by no means always definitional. See Loewenberg 1975 
b, and for some examples, Loewenberg 1975 a, pp. 328-9. 
14 Mack 1975, p. 236, recognizes this, but the 
pattern provided does not accommodate it readily. 
15Mack 1975, pp. 226, 227, 236, acknowledges 
that reinterpretation is involved. The example, 'I 
married my albatross,' was brought up in discussion 
with a question of whether 'marry' is reinterpreted in 
the utterance of this sentence. I think it clearly is. 
This is a double metaphor· 'albatross' is a dead-
metaphorical word with quite a determinate sense. To 
'marry' (metaphorically) one's (metaphorical) albatross 
involves the selection of some features of 'marry' 
(e.g , to conunit oneself to a long term relationship, 
to live with, etc.) but surely not all (e.g , to 
intend to have little albatrosses or at least 
consununate the relationship). 
16Mack 1975, p. 234, favorably compares her 
approach with those of Wheelwright, Black, Weinreich 
and Brooke-Rose. She charges that they foster the 
"misconception that metaphor operates in some special, 
almost mystical fashion." 
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17My intuition on this latter point was confirmed 
by Larry W Martin and W K. Percival 
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